1. **Spatial model of political competition and divergence**

**Theory**

Hotelling-Downs model (Hottelling 1929; Downs 1959) of spatial (political) competition assumes that the politicians announce prior to an election will be the final policies they subsequently enact once in office. In Hotteling-Downs model, announcement is commitment for the actual policy. Starting from Hotelling-Downs model, there are literature investigating one-dimensional policy competition between two politicians who have imperfect information about voter’s preferences. (Wittman 1977, 1983; Calver 1985; Roemer 1994). This imperfect information about voter’s preference leads political divergence results. There are many recent literature study the role of imperfect information and asymmetric information in various settings lead political divergence. (Arganos and Palfrey, 2002; Kartik and MacAfee, 2009, Bernhadit et al. 2009).

Osborne and Slivinski (1996) study the model where citizen has an opportunity to be a political candidate with non-binding (cheap talk) campaign promises.

**Empirical**

Merryl and Goffman (1999) investigate 1984 and 1988 races in United States using National Survey data and find that empirical evidence of policy divergence. Bugde et al. (2001) investigate speech of electoral candidate in British and United States. They also confirm political divergence. Adams et al. (2010) and Dixit (2018) used US roll-call voting data and find political divergence in US congress.

1. **Voting Experiment**

Palfrey (2009) reviewed two big strands of voting experiments. The first one is voter turnout and the second one is information aggregation of voting. Voter turnout is about a problem of probability to be a pivotal voter in the economy.

1. **Alesina (1987,1988) follow-up study**
2. **Empirical study**

*For presentation*: Ansolabehere (2006) “the problem of non-convergence to the median has been perhaps the most fruitful for the development of a more robust economic theory of elections.”